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MOORE v. THE QUEEN:1




Important cases sometimes have modest beginnings. A bystander wit-
nessing a cyclist crossing at an intersection against a red light would be ex-
cused for failing to recognize the material from which important Supreme
Court of Canada decisions might be forged. Yet from such unprepossessing
facts there emerges a case that raises important questions for the administra-
tion of criminal justice in this country. The bystander could be excused for
failing to see this, since a majority2 of the judges in the Supreme Court of
Canada also seem to have missed most of the issues. Even the minority,3 who
avoided the worst pitfalls, would appear to have been somewhat inconsistent
in the development of a coherent policy towards the problems raised by the
case. It may well be that its very mundane nature misled the Court into deal-
ing with it at face value so that its wider implications were not fully appre-
ciated.
The facts were simple and not the subject of any dispute. Mr. Moore
cycled through an intersection where a red traffic light was showing in his
direction. He declined to pull over and identify himself to a police motor-
cyclist and was arrested for wilfully obstructing a peace officer in the execu-
tion of his duty, contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.4 The accused was
tried upon an indictment before a judge and jury on this charge and was
acquitted when the trial judge, at the end of the prosecution's case, directed
the jury to find the accused "not guilty." This verdict was overturned by the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, which found that, when Mr. Moore re-
fused to accede to the constable's request for identification, he was obstruct-
ing that constable in the performance of his duties and thus committing, in
addition to the original infraction under the provincial Motor-vehicle Act,5
O Copyright, 1979, Alan Grant.
* Mr. Grant is a Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University.
1 Moore v. The Queen, [1979] 1 S.C.R 195, 90 D.L.R. (3d) 112, 43 C.C.C. (2d)
83, 5 C.R. (3d) 289, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 462, aff'g [1977] 5 W.W.R. 241.
2 Spence J. (Martland, Ritchie, Pigeon, Beetz JJ. concurring).
3 Dickson J. (Estey J. concurring).
4 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 118(a).
5 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253, ss. 127, 128 as am. by S.B.C. 1975, c. 46.
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a separate criminal offence under section 118 (a) of the Criminal Code. Since
no action was taken on the traffic offence, the only matter before the Supreme
Court of Canada was the crime of "wilfully obstructing the police." Five
members of the Supreme Court of Canada6 supported the conclusion of the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, while two1 would have restored the judg-
ment of acquittal at trial.
II. THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE TRAFFIC LAW ENFORCEMENT
Such is the death, injury and damage caused by road users that en-
forcement priorities and objectives aimed at reducing this carnage by en-
couraging good driving and punishing violations are thoroughly justified.
Indeed, there is little doubt that the deaths, injuries and damage caused by
illegal traffic manoeuvres exceed such harm from "regular" criminal activities.
There was no collision in the present case, but disobedience of traffic signs
is a major cause of accidents, and the nonoccurrence of such an event on
this occasion may well have been quite fortuitous.
The provincial legislatures take the principal role in enacting traffic
laws that will assist in attaining these ends, and one of the multitude of duties
that society places upon the police is to see that enforcement of these laws is
carried out at street level. In addition, the federal Parliament is constitution-
ally entitled to enact criminal laws dealing with serious misbehaviour by road
users, and has done so. Criminal negligence in the operation of a motor
vehicle,8 failing to stop after being involved in an accident with intent to
escape civil or criminal liability9 and dangerous driving 0 provide a few well
known examples. On this basis, both the provincial and federal legislative
bodies regulate traffic-related offences in Canada. All of the above is taken
to be axiomatic, and nothing that follows is intended to suggest that there
is no legitimate role for the criminal law in road traffic matters. It is clearly
not in the interests of the Canadian public to have ineffective laws controlling
the behaviour of road users. Practical enforcement problems may arise, how-
ever, because either of the legislative bodies may not have provided a fully
effective means for enforcing such laws. What, then, is the role of the courts
in identifying the substantive offences involved, in suggesting the appropriate
enforcement procedures, and in providing for the fair administration of the
sanctioning system thus created? These are some of the questions raised in
this case.
III. WHAT SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCES WERE COMMITTED?
All parties to the litigation agreed that Moore committed the offence of
proceeding against a red light. There is also an offence in the British Colum-
bia Motor-vehicle Act of refusing or failing to stop and identify oneself to
6 Supra note 2.
7 Supra note 3.
8 The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 233(1). O'Grady v. Sparling, [1960]
S.C.R. 804, (1961) 25 D.L.R. (2d) 145, 128 C.C.C. 1, 33 C.R.N.S. 293.
9 ld., s. 233(2).
'0 ld., s. 233(4). Binus v. The Queen, [1967] S.C.R. 594, [1968] 1 C.C.C. 227, 2
C.R.N.S. 118; Peda v. The Queen, [1969] 4 C.C.C. 245, 7 C.R.N.S. 243 (S.C.C.).
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police when driving a motor vehicle." Everyone agreed that "motor vehicle"
and "vehicle" as defined in the legislation 12 did not include a bicycle. Further,
it appeared that the section that purported to apply duties to cyclists13 placed
upon them the same rights and duties as are placed on drivers of "vehicles,"
not "motor vehicles." Thus Mr. Moore could not be said to have committed
the substantive offence under the provincial traffic legislation of failing to
stop and identify himself upon request. No court dealing with the Moore
case came to a different conclusion. Legislative drafting created a hiatus and
the courts declined the invitation to close the gap in the provincial statute by
imaginative interpretation. Oddly enough, the majority of the Supreme Court
of Canada was unable to resist this temptation in connection with the more
serious offence under federal criminal law of wilfully obstructing a policeman
in the execution of his duty.'
The Court's argument for this proposition proceeded with apparent
mathematical certainty as follows:
1) As a cyclist, Mr. Moore was subject to the same duties as a vehicle driver
(section 173(1), Motor-vehicle Act, B.C.).
2) The driver of a vehicle is obliged to stop at a red light (section 127, 128
Motor-vehicle Act, B.C.).
3) Therefore Mr. Moore was obliged to stop at the red light.
4) The constable in question was a peace officer with Victoria City Police (sec-
tions 17, 22(1) Police Act, B.C.).la
5) Such a police force is obliged to enforce criminal law and the laws of the
province and maintain law and oider in the municipality (sections 22(2)
Police Act, B.C.).
6) The constable was carrying out these duties on the occasion of his dealings
with Mr. Moore (sections 30(1), Police Act, B.C.).
7) The express powers of arrest without warrant contained in the Motor-vehicle
Act had no application to this case. (Section 63 Motor-vehicle Act).
8) The powers of arrest without warrant in the Criminal Code applied to this
situation (section 101 Sumnary Convictions Act, B.C.,16 and the Criminal
Code, section 450(2)).
9) This power to arrest without warrant for going against the red light would
only apply if it were necessary to establish Moore's identity (Criminal Code,
section 450(2) (d) (i)).
10) In requesting Moore to identify himself, the constable was carrying out the
duties of enforcing the law of the province.
11) When Moore refused to accede to the constable's request for his identifica-
tion, he was obstructing that constable in the performance of his duties.
It is submitted that, while propositions 1 to 7 and 10 are correct, pro-
positions 8, 9 and 11 are wrong in law. Proposition 11 raises a question of
substantive law, i.e., were the essential ingredients of the offence substan-
11R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253, s. 58(a)(b).
12 Id., s. 2.
"3 S.B.C. 1975, c. 46, s. 173(1).
14 The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, s. 118(a).
15 S.B.C. 1974, c. 64. [Query whether on the particular offence being considered his
being a "peace officer" under s. 2 of the Criminal Code was not more relevant, but no
one in the Supreme Court considered this. Nothing turns on this point, however, since
the constable obviously came within the Criminal Code definition in any event.]
16 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 373.
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tiated? Propositions 8 and 9 raise a question of criminal procedure, namely,
was there a power of arrest in the circumstances? This part will continue to
deal with the substantive offence and the part following will consider the
power of arrest question. It should be noted, however, that the majority pro-
ceeded to the substantive question by making the existence of a power of ar-
rest a necessary link in the chain of its argument. As a result, even if the
reader is not convinced by my criticism of the answer reached on the sub-
stantive question, then provided that the next section succeeds in showing
that there was no power of arrest in the circumstances, the conclusion of the
majority of the Court on the substantive offences must still be erroneous.
On the substantive question, the majority simply states that: "A con-
stable on duty observed the appellant in the act of committing an infraction
of the [Motor-vehicle Act] and ... that the constable had no power to arrest
the accused for such offence unless and until he had attempted to identify the
accused so that he might be the subject of summary conviction proceedings."
The result of this is that "when the appellant Moore refused to accede to the
constable's request for his identification he was obstructing that constable in
the performance of his duties."'17
There are two major questions here. First, the wisdom of elevating pro-
vincial summary conviction offences into full-blown crimes under the Criminal
Code. Second, the question of the accused's being obliged to identify himself
which the Court held to arise from section 450(2) of the Criminal Code.
On the first question, it is perfectly competent for the British Columbia
Legislature to make it an offence to fail to identify oneself to the police.
Indeed, they have done so expressly in section 58 of the Motor-vehicle Act. 18
Poor draftsmanship resulted in the obligation applying to motor vehicle
drivers, but not to "cyclists." Thus a case can be made for including cyclists
in the same category and subject to the same penalties as motor vehicle
drivers, but surely not for saying that cyclists commit a Criminal Code offence
punishable on indictment by two years' imprisonment. Could anything be
more curious? The offender whom the province either ignored or deemed too
insignificant to punish by a fine becomes a "real criminal" under the Criminal
Code as a result of this decision.
On the second question, the Supreme Court of Canada makes a funda-
mental mistake. Section 450(2) was introduced into the Criminal Code by
the Bail Reform Actsa to prevent inter alia, unnecessary arrests from being
made where accused persons identified themselves and arrest was otherwise
unnecessary. The duty in section 450(2) is on the constable not to arrest
unless the accused cannot be identified or certain other factors are present.
This surely places no duty at all on the accused to supply this information.
He can choose to be arrested rather than identify himself. If the majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada is right, then, in every case where a constable
is relieved of his duty not to arrest by reason of a refusal by the accused to
SSutpra note 1, at 203 (S.C.R.), 119 (D.L.R.), 89 (C.C.C.) per Spence J. (The
sentences are placed here in the chronological order in which the events they describe
occurred.)
18 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253.
18a R.S.C. 1970, c. 2 (2d Supp.) s. 5.
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identify himself, there would always be at least two charges against the
accused, i.e., first, the original offence for which the arrest was made, and
second, a charge of wilful obstruction of the police by failing to identify him-
self.
It was surely never intended that section 450(2) become a trap to
create more offences where people did not identify themselves to the police,
but the object was to prevent unnecessary arrests where identity was revealed.
This decision, therefore, results in a ludicrous reversal of what was sought
to be achieved by section 450(2).
The minority decision rejects the application of the Criminal Code of-
fence to the facts of this case on the basis that there was no "common law,"
"implied" or "reciprocal" duty upon the accused to identify himself such that
a refusal would create a discrete substantive offence. This position was sup-
ported (in the view of Dickson J., Estey J. concurring) by the presumption
of innocence, the privilege against self-incrimination and the fact that to hold
otherwise would be to render totally superfluous all express statutory provi-
sions making it a specific offence to fail to identify oneself in the specific
circumstances identified by the legislation in question. In other words, if
there was a general duty to identify oneself, why would there be the need
for such specific* legislative obligations? This is the strongest part of the
minority judgment. It is well reasoned and resort is made to relevant Cana-
dian and English case law and academic treatises. It is clearly superior to the
majority decision which relies on a solitary English authority, and then only
to state that it is irrelevant. This case, Rice v. Connolly,19 holds that there
is no general power in the police to demand that a citizen identify himself
under penalty of obstructing the police if he declines to do so.
The majority decision agrees that there is no such general duty under
Canadian law either, but claims that this does not apply where the person to
whom the demand is made has committed an offence. This conclusion is,
however, firmly tied to the provisions of section 450(2) of the Criminal Code,
and this reverses the whole role and purpose of that subsection. Unfortunately,
this misconception, which led the majority astray on the substantive question,
caused the minority (which answered the substantive question, in my view,
correctly) to be misled on the issue of the power of arrest, to which we now
turn.
IV. WAS THERE A POWER OF ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT?
The British Columbia legislature did, in fact, make express provision for
powers of arrest without warrant in the Motor-vehicle Act in section 63.20
It was no part of the argument of the majority or the minority of the Supreme
Court, however, that this section applied to the facts of this case. Both hold,
nevertheless, that certain powers of arrest in the Criminal Code became avail-
able because of section 101 of the British Columbia Summary Convictions
Act which states:
Where, in any proceeding, matter or thing to which this Act applies, express
provision has not been made in this Act or only partial provision had been made,
10 [1966] 2 All E.R. 649.
20 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 253.
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the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to offences punishable upon summary
conviction apply, mutatis mttandis as if the provisions thereof were enacted in
and formed part of this Act.
21
This provision leads both the majority and the minority directly to sec-
tion 450(2) of the Criminal Code. This subsection structures the exercise of
discretion by a peace officer in deciding whether or not to make an arrest
without a warrant, but the arrest, per se, is expressly authorized under sec-
tion 450(1). This is very important. Section 450(2) contains no powers of ar-
rest at all. Dickson J., is clearly in error when he says: "Although Constable
Sutherland had no power under s. 63 of the Motor Vehicle Act to arrest the
accused without a warrant, additional powers of arrest contained in s. 450(2)
of the Criminal Code were available. '12 2
In a similar vein, it is submitted that Spence J. allows himself to be
misled by saying in respect of section 450(2): "In accordance with those
provisions, Constable Sutherland could only have arrested Moore for the
summary conviction offence of proceeding against a red light if it were neces-
sary to establish his identity." [Emphasis added.]2 3
To understand what is happening here, it is necessary to distinguish the
powers of arrest without warrant per se (section 450(1)) from the restric-
tions placed upon their application (section 450(2)). Neither the majority
nor the minority quotes directly from section 450(1). Had they done so,
they would have found that the Criminal Code does not grant a power to
arrest without warrant for a "summary conviction offence." The subsection
states:
A peace officer may arrest without warrant
(a) a person who has committed an indictable offence or who, on reasonable and
probable grounds, he believes has committed or is about to commit an in-
dictable offence,
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence, or
(c) a person for whose arrest he has reasonable and probable grounds to believe
that a warrant is in force within the territorial jurisdiction in which the person
is found. [Emphasis added.]
Since no indictable offence and no warrant was involved in this case,
only section 450(1) (b) can be relevant. But this subsection makes no refer-
ence to a summary conviction offence. Since section 101 of the British Co-
lumbia Summary Convictions Act applies the provisions of the Criminal Code
relating to offences punishable on summary convictions, this section does not
expressly apply the provisions of the Criminal Code relating to "a criminal
offence. '24 Nor is it so clear that the words mutatis mutandis in section 101
of the provincial legislation will be sufficient to refer to a power related to
21 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 373.
22 Supra note 1, at 208 (S.C.R.), 122 (D.L.R.), 93 (C.C.C.).
23 1d., at 203 (S.C.R.), 118 (D.L.R.), 89 (C.C.C.).
24 Since all offences that are not indictable must be summary conviction offences
it is not unreasonable to assume that Parliament intended something different to flow
from its use of the expression "criminal offence" than would have been the case if the
expression "summary conviction offence" had been used. But even if it did not, this
issue can form no part of the argument of any of the justices in the Supreme Court of
Canada. They did not deal with s. 450(1) at all.
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"a criminal offence" in section 450(1) (b) of the Criminal Code. Certainly,
by never mentioning section 450(1), the Justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada could not have turned their minds to this question. The Court might
have been better served by an argument that linked sectiofi 101 of the British
Columbia Summary Convictions Act to Part XXIV of the Criminal Code -
entitled Summary Convictions. Section 728, contained therein, applies Part
XIV mutatis mutandis "with respect to compelling the appearance of an ac-
cused before a justice," and this includes section 450(1), the arrest powers
section, and section 450(2), the restrictions on their exercise. This, at least,
would have been more competent statutory construction than directly linking
section 101 of the Summary Convictions Act to section 450(2) of the Crim-
inal Code. Even so, it would then require the mutatis mutandis provision of
section 101 to be applied through the mutatis mutandis provision in section
728 (1 ) of the Criminal Code to give the policeman a power of arrest without
warrant in the circumstances of this case. To adopt this very tenuous con-
struction would be quite out of keeping with the rest of the reasoning of
Dickson and Estey JJ., who were unwilling to create a substantive criminal
offence out of Mr. Moore's refusal to identify himself. Why would they wish
to restrict the application of a crime in the Criminal Code to circumstances
able to be covered by properly drafted provincial legislation in respect of the
substantive offence, and yet be willing to engage in mental gymnastics to
apply the arrest provisions of the Criminal Code to provincial legislation?
By ignoring section 450(1), both the majority and minority were led to
shortcut the connection between section 101 of the British Columbia Sum-
mary Convictions Act and section 450(2) of the Code, but the minority was
inconsistent in applying federal procedural provisions, while declining to do
the same with substantive questions. The majority was consistent, at least,
in applying both substantive and procedural provisions of the Criminal Code
to this matter but, in my view, the consistency involved was in being consis-
tently wrong in doing so.
The point which no one in the Supreme Court of Canada seems to have
grasped is that one has to have a power of arrest under section 450 (1) before
the duty not to arrest can possibly arise under any of the circumstances out-
lined in section 450(2). 25 This is made plain by section 450(3) whereby, if
a peace officer wrongly ignores his duty not to arrest under section 450(2)
and proceeds to arrest, that arrest is still a valid one for the purposes of the
Criminal Code, i.e., his breach of duty is left to the civil courts to remedy on
an action taken by the person unnecessarily arrested. This would be impos-
sible if the power to arrest arose because of the presence of the factors (in-
cluding inability to establish identity) mentioned in section 450(2) since,
on the formulation by the Supreme Court, there could be no possible basis
for the arrest.
Thus, Spence J. is wrong when he says: "In accordance with [s. 450(2)
Code] Constable Sutherland could only have arrested Moore for the summary
conviction offence of proceeding against a red light if it were necessary to
25 See generally Scollin, The Bail Reform Act (Toronto: Carswell, 1972) especially
at 4 and 26.
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establish his identity. '26 On the contrary, Constable Sutherland could only
have arrested Moore for the summary conviction offence of proceeding
against a red light if he had a power to arrest Moore under section 450(1),
and only then would have had a duty not to arrest him if Mr. Moore identi-
fied himself and none of the other factors mentioned in section 450(2) ap-
plied to the case. Since section 450(1) makes no mention of a summary
conviction offence, Spence J. can have no assistance from this subsection,
and to the extent that the minority justices agree with Spence J.'s analysis,
they too are in error on this point.
2 7
The ultimate question in this procedural part of the case should be, "If
the province has expressly granted some powers of arrest without warrant for
some provincial offences (section 63) but not others, should the courts be
so keen to find that such powers can be inferred by tortuous reasoning from
federal legislative sources?" It is surely a solid argument that such a question
ought to be answered in the negative if to do otherwise would result in such
a wide availability of powers of arrest without warrant that the express provi-
sions by the provincial legislature on the point are rendered totally super-
fluous. This is the argument which the minority found compelling on the sub-
stantive question, yet unaccountably ignored on the procedural issue.
Since the provinces often pass legislation with express powers to arrest
without warrant it is not at all unlikely that, in a case where they have not
done so, it was their intention that such powers not be granted. After all,
arrest without warrant is the most intrusive means of commencing a prosecu-
tion and the one which involves the greatest interference with a citizen's
liberty. It is usually carried out by a junior public official and often occurs
in an entirely unsupervised setting. It would not be surprising if a legislature
decided to reduce the incidence of such activity in respect of minor offences.
If the legislature has not made its intention thoroughly clear on the issue, any
doubt should surely be resolved in favour of not finding that such sweeping
powers have been granted in the case of minor offences.
In theory, the legislature can clearly express itself on the point and ac-
cept, at the polls, the verdict of the public if the law-maker has overstressed
effective law enforcement in balancing competing societal interests. It may be,
of course, that democracy does not work quite so directly. A government,
making express the power to arrest unconditionally for all summary convic-
tion offences and thus ensuring effective law enforcement, may not be dis-
comfitted at the polls because this issue may be dwarfed by others more com-
pelling. It is a possibility that will never be put to the test if we continue to
have ambiguous legislation interpreted by the judges in such a way that the
legislature can deny that it is responsible for any draconian effects thereby
produced, while the independence of the judiciary ensures that the inter-
preters are insulated from normal political processes. It is a system worthy
of Kafka. 28 The legislature, which is responsible to the electorate, passes
26 Supra note 23.
27 Supra note I, at 208 (S.C.R.), 122-23 (D.L.R.), 92-93 (C.C.C.).
28 Kafka, The Trial (New York: Knopf, 1937). The classic tale of benign arrest
(the accused is left at liberty), formless trial (the nature of the charge is never ascer-
tained) but nevertheless certain (and for the accused fatal) result.
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"soft" (or ambiguous) laws that are interpreted "harshly" by a judiciary
that is free of electoral sanction.29
V. ESCALATION OF POLICE AND PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A court has to take responsibility for the legal system which its decisions
help to shape. The result of the majority decision in Moore will be to make
it possible for every case in which an arrest has to be made in order to
identify the accused to result in an additional charge of obstructing the
police. Where provincial statutes make it an offence in certain circumstances
not to identify oneself (e.g., British Columbia Motor-vehicle Act, section
58), there will be the possibility of charging the provincial offence and, in
addition, the Criminal Code offence arising out of the same fact situation.
This encourages horizontal overcharging (laying a greater number of charges
than the facts warrant) and vertical overcharging (laying more serious charges
than the facts warrant). Both are well recognized devices used as a means of
obtaining a plea of guilty to one offence in exchange for the Crown's agree-
ing not to proceed with the other. Where such practices are followed auto-
matically, this is an example of the unacceptable side of plea-bargaining.30
More generally, the availability of such additional charges allows un-
structured Crown discretion in respect of who will be prosecuted for a Crim-
inal Code offence that is punishable by two years imprisonment on indict-
ment, and who will be allowed to face a mere provincial violation punishable
by a small monetary penalty. The unwillingness of the Supreme Court of
Canada to control Crown discretion,2' or to develop an abuse of process
doctrine32 could be balanced to some extent if the Court's decisions, in cases
such as this, discouraged or reduced opportunities for engaging in unfettered
Crown discretion. But it seems we must endure the worst of both worlds-
no control of Crown discretion and decisions like the present which increase
the ambit for its exercise.
VI. CONCLUSION
None of these effects was a necessary result of the problem posed by
Mr. Moore's conduct. Of course, the administration of justice grinds to a
halt if an offence is committed for which there is no power to arrest and the
accused refuses to identify himself to police. But there is a remedy. The
British Columbia legislature should have been left to amend its traffic laws
to make clear provision for cyclists who do not identify themselves to police
29 The whole growth of strict liability in the criminal law can be viewed as an
example of this phenomenon at work: see R. v. Prince (1875), 2 C.C.R. 154, [1874-80]
All E.R. Rep. 881, and the myriad of cases to which it gave birth. See also The Meaning
of Guilt: Strict Liability (Law Reform Commission of Canada Working Paper No. 2,
1974).
30 See Hooper, Discovery in Criminal Cases (1972), 50 Can. B. Rev. 445 at 462,
for a description of vertical and horizontal overcharging and their use in plea bargaining.
21 R. v. Smythe, [1971] S.C.R. 680, 19 D.L.R. (3d) 480, 3 C.C.C. (2d) 366, 16
C.R.N.S. 147.
3 2 R. v. Osborn, [1971] S.C.R. 184, 15 D.L.R. (3d) 85, 1 C.C.C. (2d) 482, 12
C.R.N.S. 1. Rourke v. The Queen (1977), 76 D.L.R. (3d) 193, 35 C.C.C. (2d) 129,
38 C.R.N.S. 268.
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(by amending section 58 of the Motor-vehicle Act) and, should it so desire,
to provide for additional powers of arrest without warrant (by amending
section 63 of the Motor-vehicle Act).
The last thing that should have happened was for the Supreme Court of
Canada to find an enforcement solution for this particular case that will
have consequences for substantive, procedural and administrative aspects of
criminal law enforcement far and beyond the confines of this case. These
include:
1) A widening of the substantive criminal offence of wilfully obstructing the
police by turning a police duty not to arrest in certain circumstances into a
positive citizen's duty to identify oneself in such cases. 33
2) A widening of procedural criminal law by allowing the powers of arrest for
"criminal offences" to be applied to provincial summary conviction offences
without express legislative intention being so indicated by the province.3 4
3) An increase in the opportunity for unsupervised police and prosecutorial dis-
cretion in laying charges and engaging in improper aspects of plea bargaining
by unnecessarily creating concurrent coverage of the same conduct by federal
crimes and provincial infractions.
These, then, are the results which the Supreme Court of Canada has
achieved. It is hard to believe that this is what the Court would have chosen
to do if all of the issues had been properly analyzed.
33 For another example of extending the ambit of this offence by the Supreme Court
of Canada, see R. v. Stenning, [1970] S.C.R. 631, 10 D.L.R. (3d) 224, 3 C.C.C. 145,
11 C.R.N.S. 68, and comment thereon in Grant, The Supreme Court of Canada and the
Police (1977-78), 20 Crim. L.Q. 152 at 155.
34 For another example of extending arrest powers in minor cases by the Supreme
Court of Canada, see R. v. Biron, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 56, 59 D.L.R. (3d) 409, 4 N.R. 45,
23 C.C.C. (2d) 513, 30 C.R.N.S. 109 and comment thereon in Grant, Supra note 33,
at 157 ff. This extension of police power beyond that recognized at common law is
also evident in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Eccles v. Bourque dealing
with forced entry to private premises by police acting without a search warrant: [1975]
2 S.C.R. 739, 50 D.L.R. (3d) 435, 3 N.R. 259, [1975] 1 W.W.R. 609, 19 C.C.C. (2d)
129, 27 C.R.N.S. 325, and comment thereon in Grant, supra note 33, at 161 ff. note
33 at 161 et seq.
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